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KEEPING UP WITH TECHNOLOGY: WHY A FLEXIBLE 
JUVENILE SEXTING STATUTE IS NEEDED TO 
PREVENT OVERLY SEVERE PUNISHMENT IN 
WASHINGTON STATE 
Reid McEllrath 
Abstract: Sexting can be a costly activity, particularly for teenagers. As more teenagers 
engage in sending sexually explicit images to one another, the likelihood of serious long-term 
consequences increases. When sexting is used as a means to bully, the potential severity of 
consequences also increases. In many jurisdictions, prosecutors may charge juveniles caught 
sexting with possession or distribution of child pornography. At the same time, some states 
have recognized the severity of such a charge and found other ways of addressing the teen 
sexting problem. This Comment addresses the current issues surrounding juvenile sexting by 
examining empirical data, legal responses, and legislative reactions. It argues that 
Washington’s current approach to juvenile sexting is inappropriate and should be amended. It 
suggests a two-tiered statute that separates non-malicious juvenile sexting from malicious 
juvenile sexting. The proposed statute, which would punish cyberbullying and malicious 
juvenile sexting more severely, will allow Washington to effectively deter harmful behavior 
while taking into account juvenile immaturity. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, a Pennsylvania District Attorney called a meeting with a 
number of teenagers and their parents in the community.1 The topic of 
discussion was a serious and sensitive one—child pornography. The 
District Attorney informed the parents and teenagers that sexually 
suggestive images of some of the teenagers were found circulating via 
cell phones among the local schools. The parents, worried about their 
children, asked to see the pictures. The photos showed the teenage girls 
in training bras, towels, and bathing suits. One parent tried to account for 
the pictures, saying the girls were simply being “goofballs.”2 The 
District Attorney disagreed and threatened prosecution, calling the 
pictures sexually suggestive.3 
That same year, a teenage girl in Ohio sent nude images to her 
1. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010). 
2. Id. at 144. 
3. See Tamar Lewin, Court Says Parents Can Block “Sexting” Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 
2010, at A18; Saul Relative, Pennsylvania Teen Sues over Sexting Pictures, YAHOO VOICES (Mar. 
30, 2009), http://voices.yahoo.com/pennsylvania-teens-sue-over-sexting-pictures-2967606.html?cat=46. 
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boyfriend.4 Soon after, the two broke up.5 When the ex-boyfriend 
decided to share the images with some of the other girls at school, the 
group began to harass the girl.6 Other students who found out about the 
pictures started calling her a “whore.”7 She began to skip classes to 
avoid the harassment.8 In an attempt to alert others of the effects of such 
bullying, she went on a television station to tell her story.9 
Unfortunately, the harassment continued, and two months after the 
interview, the girl committed suicide.10 
The media attention these stories received,11 along with others like 
them,12 illustrates the complexities of addressing the growing problem of 
juvenile sexting. Sexting is commonly considered “the practice of 
sending or posting sexually suggestive text messages and images, 
including nude or semi-nude photographs, via cellular telephones or over 
the Internet.”13 As cellular phones expand their capabilities and become 
more ubiquitous among teenagers, prosecutors in many jurisdictions face 
the predicament of charging teenagers with overly severe child 
pornography crimes.14 Unfortunately, most state legislatures have not 
given this problem the attention it deserves. As of publication, only 
twenty states have enacted laws exempting juvenile sexting from the 
4. Mike Celizic, Her Teen Committed Suicide over “Sexting”, TODAY (Mar. 6, 2009, 9:26 AM), 
http://www.today.com/id/29546030/ns/today-parenting_and_family/t/her-teen-committed-suicide-
over-sexting/#.UvwM4Hk1dg1. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. See Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 2010); Celizic, supra note 4. 
12. See, e.g., Justin Jouvenal, “Sexting” Case Fuels Debate over Punishment for Teens, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 18, 2013, at A1; Paris Achen, Sex Crimes Team Will Investigate Eagle Point “Sexting”, 
MAIL TRIBUNE (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.mailtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20091217/ 
NEWS07/912170346; Hector Becerra, Teen “Sexting” Case: “There’s 6th and 7th Graders Doing 
This”, L.A. TIMES (May 10, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/10/local/la-me-ln-sexting-
underage-20130510; Dave Summers & Christina London, Charges to Be Filed in Teen Sexting 
Ring, NBC 7 SAN DIEGO (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/Charges-To-Be-
Filed-in-Teen-Sexting-Ring-229646361.html. 
13. Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 637 (M.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Miller, 598 
F.3d at 139.  
14. See, e.g., Miller, 598 F.3d at 143; A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2007); Frank Graham, Student Gets Year Probation for “Sexting”, NORTH PLATTE BULLETIN (May 
12, 2009), http://www.northplattebulletin.com/index.asp?show=news&action=readStory&storyID= 
16546&pageID=3. 
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harsh punishments of child pornography.15 This leaves teenagers in 
many states, including Washington, subject to child pornography laws. 
This Comment examines the legal dilemmas brought on by juvenile 
sexting and proposes a statutory alternative to Washington’s current 
approach. Part I provides background information on juvenile sexting 
and cyberbullying before discussing empirical data on juvenile 
immaturity. Part II explores legislative and prosecutorial responses to 
juvenile sexting and cyberbullying.  Part III discusses the need for a 
change in Washington’s current statutory scheme, arguing for a two-
tiered statute that separates non-malicious juvenile sexting from 
malicious juvenile sexting. It further argues that neither tier should be 
subject to sex offender registration. This approach would more 
effectively account for juvenile immaturity, while still providing the 
means for punishing malicious sexting in cases like cyberbullying. 
I. THE RISING PROBLEM OF JUVENILE SEXTING 
Cell phones have become ubiquitous and studies show that juveniles 
are sexting.16 A 2013 study found that seventy-eight percent of teens 
between the ages of twelve and seventeen have a cell phone.17 Further, 
surveys have shown that up to twenty-eight percent of teenagers have 
sent a sexually suggestive or nude photo of themselves.18 
Advances in cell phones and cell phone applications have made it 
easier to send and receive sexually explicit images. Camera phones and 
smart phones are no longer a luxury, but are now the norm. With camera 
phones, users have the freedom to take pictures at any time without the 
inconvenience of carrying a separate camera. Smart phones can access 
the internet, providing the additional option of posting images to a 
websites and social networks. Smart phone users can also download 
15. See Sameer Hinduja & Justin Patchin, State Sexting Laws, CYBERBULLYING RES. CENTER 
(Sept. 2014), http://www.cyberbullying.us/state_sexting_laws.pdf. 
16. See Eric Rice et al., Sexually Explicit Cell Phone Messaging Associated With Sexual Risk 
Among Adolescents, 130 PEDIATRICS 667, 670 (2012). 
17. Mary Madden et al., Teens and Technology 2013, PEW RESEARCH CENTER 2 (2013), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media/Files/Reports/2013/PIP_TeensandTechnology2013.pdf. 
18. See, e.g., Jeff R. Temple et al., Teen Sexting and Its Association with Sexual Behaviors, 166 
ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 828, 829 (2012); Amanda Lenhart, Teens and 
Sexting: How and Why Minor Teens Are Sending Sexually Suggestive Nude or Nearly Nude Images 
Via Text Messaging, PEW RES. CENTER 2 (2009), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/ 
Reports/2009/PIP_Teens_and_Sexting.pdf; Nat’l Campaign to Prevent Teen & Unplanned 
Pregnancy & Cosmogirl.com, Sex and Tech: Results from a Survey of Teens and Young Adults, 
COSMOGIRL.COM 1, http://www.afim.org/SexTech_Summary.pdf.  
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phone application software like Snapchat,19 an application that facilitates 
the sexting phenomenon by providing users a sense of security that 
images will be destroyed rather than saved by the receiver and shared 
with others.20 As a result, Snapchat users may feel more at ease sending 
a sexually explicit image with the expectation that it will exist only 
temporarily.21 Unfortunately, there are several ways to save or retrieve a 
Snapchat photo,22 making such feelings of security erroneous. 
Cell phones capable of sexting create a number of potentially serious 
problems when in the hands of teenagers. Sexting facilitates 
cyberbullying, which may lead to emotional and long-term 
consequences for both the receiver and the sender.23 Teenagers sending 
sexually suggestive or nude photos can be prosecuted or threatened with 
prosecution under child pornography statutes.24 Such statutes are 
intended to reduce the availability of child pornography and to protect 
the victims of child pornography.25 These laws often prohibit the 
possession or dissemination of such photos generally; in addition to 
prosecution the teenager can face felonious penalties and, depending on 
the applicable statute, the possibility of sex offender registration.26 In 
addition to sex offender registration, sexting can also jeopardize 
teenagers’ futures by permanently putting compromising images online, 
making such images available to potential employers, academic 
institutions, and family members.27 
19. An application for sending pictures to other users in which the pictures are deleted after a set 
amount of time. iTunes Preview: Snapchat, APPLE ITUNES, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/ 
snapchat/id447188370?mt=8 (last visited June 21, 2014).  
20. Dominique Mosbergen, Snapchat “Hacks” Make Using “iPhone Sexting App” to Send 
Incriminating Photos a Bad Idea, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 1, 2013, 6:32 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/22/snapchat-hacks-iphone-sexting_n_2528803.html. 
21. Kaja Whitehouse, Snapchat Sexting Scandal Could Scare off Investors, N.Y. POST (Nov. 13, 
2013, 9:48 PM), http://nypost.com/2013/11/14/snapchat-sexting-scandal-could-scare-off-investors/.  
22. Id. (explaining that recipients have several ways of saving or retrieving a Snapchat photo, 
including taking a screenshot, finding the hidden file on the phone, or recording the photo with 
another phone). 
23. See infra Part I.A. 
24. See, e.g., Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 2010). 
25. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.001 (2012). 
26. See id. § 9A.44.130 (2012). 
27. Kimberly J. Mitchell et al., Prevalence and Characteristics of Youth Sexting: A National 
Study, 129 PEDIATRICS 1, 2 (2012). 
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A. Sexting and Cyberbullying 
Sexting in and of itself is not an inherently illegal activity.28 The law 
does not concern itself with private sexual activity among consenting 
adults.29 However, the nature of the activity changes once the messages 
leave the confines of a consenting relationship and spread to other 
viewers. Once the messages leak into a more public environment, the 
original participants no longer enjoy the privacy they may have initially 
expected. Without control of the sensitive content, the persons sexting 
are at the mercy of anyone with access to the image. For consenting 
adults caught sexting, the consequences may not be severe.30 Teenagers, 
however, may be subject to bullying and ridicule.31 
Cyberbullying can create severe consequences for juvenile sexting. 
Cyberbullying is bullying that takes place using cell phones and the 
internet.32 It presents additional concerns that are unique compared to 
more traditional bullying because it can be harsher, farther-reaching, 
anonymous, and unpredictable.33 This type of bullying can also lead to 
devastating consequences for both the victim and bully.34 A juvenile 
posing in a sexual image can be left with emotional issues. In one study, 
seventy percent of respondents who had appeared in or created sexting 
images and sixty-three percent of respondents who had received such 
images reported feeling either “very” or “extremely” upset, embarrassed, 
or afraid.35 Cyberbullying that leads to such mental and emotional stress 
28. Sam M. Krattiger, Comment, Sex-Cells: Evaluating Punishments for Teen “Sexting” in 
Oklahoma and Beyond, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 317, 317 (2011). 
29. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that adults had the right to engage in 
consensual, private sexual conduct under the Due Process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments). 
30. See, e.g., FAQ on ‘Sexting’ and ‘Sextortion’, CONNECTSAFELY (Feb. 1, 2013), 
http://www.connectsafely.org/faq-on-sexting-and-sextortion/. 
31. See, e.g., Celizic, supra note 4; Steve Almasy et al., Sherriff: Taunting Posts Lead to Arrests 
in Rebecca Sedwick Bullying Death, CNN (Oct. 16, 2013, 8:53 AM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2013/10/15/justice/rebecca-sedwick-bullying-death-arrests/; Jessica Logan Suicide: Parents of 
Dead Teen Sue School, Friends over Sexting Harassment, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 3, 2010, 6:12 
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/07/jessica-logan-suicide-par_n_382825.html. 
32. What is Cyberbullying?, NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, http://www.ncpc.org/topics/ 
cyberbullying/what-is-cyberbullying (last visited Feb. 2, 2014). 
33. Id. 
34. Lori Tobias, Teenager Gets Jail in “Sexting” Case, THE OREGONIAN, Oct. 17, 2009, at B2 
(reporting about a juvenile defendant who pled guilty to charges of sexual abuse and solicitation to 
encourage child sexual abuse after she recorded a dog having oral contact with her drunk, semi-
nude friend at a party and sent the picture to others in the community). 
35. Mitchell et al., supra note 27, at 5. 
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can have tragic results—including suicide36—creating a serious issue 
among juveniles that would be in society’s best interest to resolve. 
B.  Empirical Data Shows that Juveniles Lack Psychosocial Maturity 
One explanation as to why teenagers are more susceptible to sexting 
and its ill effects might be the underdevelopment of their psychosocial 
maturity. Various studies illustrate reasons against severely punishing 
juvenile sexting, showing that juveniles lack psychosocial maturity and 
future-oriented thinking.37 Because of this, juveniles are less likely to 
fully understand and consider the consequences associated with 
sexting.38 Because juveniles, unlike adults, do not consider the 
consequences of their actions, juveniles may be less culpable than 
adults.39 
Juveniles’ psychosocial immaturity leads them to be heavily 
influenced by short-term rewards.40 Research shows that teenagers lack 
many decision-making skills they will possess as adults,41 including the 
ability to consider the consequences of their actions.42 During 
adolescence, the brain begins its final stages of maturation and continues 
to rapidly develop well into a person’s early twenties, concluding around 
the age of twenty-five.43 The prefrontal cortex, which governs the 
“executive functions” of reasoning—advanced thought and impulse 
control—is the final area of the human brain to mature.44 Although 
teenagers’ cognitive capacities approximate an adult’s, their judgment 
and actual decision-making may differ from an adult’s based on 
36. Michael Inbar, “Sexting” Bullying Cited in Teen’s Suicide, TODAY (Dec. 2, 2009, 10:26 AM), 
http://www.today.com/id/34236377#.UxBW-9w1dg0 (reporting that a teenage girl hung herself 
after a topless photo of herself spread throughout her middle school and local high school). 
37. Robin D’Antona, Sexting, Texting, Cyberbullying and Keeping Youth Safe Online, 6 J. SOC. 
SCI. 523, 524 (2010). 
38. See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: 
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 1009, 1012 (2003). 
39. See infra Part II.A. 
40. See Steinberg & Scott, supra note 38, at 1012. 
41. See Donald S. Strassberg et al., Sexting by High School Students: An Exploratory and 
Descriptive Study, 42 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 15, 19 (2013); Laurence Steinberg, Should the 
Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public Policy?, 28 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 67, 74 
(2012); Steinberg & Scott, supra note 38, at 1012. 
42. See Steinberg, supra note 41, at 74. 
43. See Adolescent Brain Development & Juvenile Justice Fact Sheet, ACT 4 JUVENILE JUSTICE, 
http://www.act4jj.org/sites/default/files/ckfinder/files/factsheet_12.pdf (last visited July 22, 2014). 
44. Id. 
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teenagers’ psychosocial immaturity.45 This can make teenagers deficient 
in their decision-making capacity.46 
Psychosocial immaturity also increases the likelihood of being 
influenced by peers. Research shows that juveniles lacking in 
psychosocial maturity generally are more responsive to peer pressure, 
more impulsive, less future-oriented, and place less weight on risk in 
risk-reward calculus.47 Conversely, controlling impulses, planning 
ahead, and resisting peer influence increases from pre-adolescence to 
post-adolescence, and sometimes continues to increase into adulthood.48 
This data may suggest that if juveniles are driven more by immediate 
reward than by fear of risk, juveniles are less likely to rely on the 
possible consequences of their actions when making decisions and are 
more likely to consider only immediate rewards like peer approval. 
Even when juveniles know of possible legal consequences, they often 
neither care49 nor consider legal consequences a serious threat when 
sexting.50 A study of high school students found that over a third of the 
students who reported sending a sexually explicit picture did so despite 
knowing that, if they were apprehended for the picture, serious legal 
consequences would follow.51 Another survey found that fifty-four 
percent of respondents did not consider getting in trouble with the law a 
concern when sending or posting “sexy” pictures or videos of 
themselves.52 This further illustrates that juveniles lack risk 
consideration when weighing the long-term risks and rewards of sexting. 
Without full psychosocial maturity, juveniles are less likely to 
competently contemplate the consequences of their actions.53 
These three elements of psychosocial immaturity make teenagers less 
capable of avoiding the pitfalls of juvenile sexting. While adults are 
equipped with social tools to help them adequately consider and avoid 
the consequences of sexting, teenagers are not.54 However, many 
states—including Washington—hold juvenile sexting to the same legal 
45. See Steinberg & Scott, supra note 38, at 1012. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Strassberg, supra note 41, at 19. 
50. See, e.g., Sex and Tech: Results from a Survey of Teens and Young Adults, supra note 18, at 
14. 
51. Strassberg, supra note 41, at 19. 
52. Sex and Tech: Results from a Survey of Teens and Young Adults, supra note 18, at 14. 
53. See Steinberg & Scott, supra note 38, at 1012. 
54. Id. 
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standards as child pornography,55 raising questions of whether such 
equal treatment is fair or just. 
II. PUNISHMENT OF JUVENILE SEXTING 
The legal responses to juvenile sexting vary among jurisdictions, but 
some similarities transcend jurisdictional lines. The United States 
Supreme Court has expressed some principles for the general treatment 
of juvenile criminals,56 but has yet to comment on the specific issue of 
juvenile sexting. This void leaves states with the opportunity to develop 
their own specific approach to juvenile sexting. Some prosecutors have 
responded to the increased popularity of juvenile sexting by charging 
juveniles under child pornography statutes.57 Another possible response 
to juvenile sexting is through legislation. Twenty state legislative bodies 
have responded to juvenile sexting by limiting the statutory penalties, 
reducing the severity of such penalties, or both.58 However, Washington 
is not one of the twenty states that have reformed their codes to address 
juvenile sexting.59 Washington’s lack of a legislative response to the 
juvenile sexting phenomenon leaves its juveniles subject to the state’s 
strict child pornography laws.60 
A. The Supreme Court’s Take on Punishing Juveniles 
Courts generally take into account the detrimental effect immaturity 
has on a juvenile’s ability to weigh consequences.61 In Thompson v. 
Oklahoma,62 the United States Supreme Court overturned the death 
sentence of a fifteen-year-old who was convicted of first-degree 
55. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.050 (2012). 
56. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
57. See, e.g., Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010); A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 235 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (the juveniles were “charged as juveniles under the [state’s] child 
pornography laws”). 
58. See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 15. 
59. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.050. 
60. See id.; see also, e.g., Jan Hoffman, A Girl’s Nude Photo, and Altered Lives, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/27/us/27sexting.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
61. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (holding juveniles cannot be sentenced to life 
imprisonment without an opportunity for parole for a non-homicide offense); Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding it unconstitutional to impose the death penalty when the crime was 
committed while under the age of eighteen); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 815 (overturning the death 
sentence of a minor on the grounds of cruel and unusual punishment). 
62. 487 U.S. 815. 
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murder.63 Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, recognized the 
immature judgment of youth and determined that such a severe 
punishment would violate proportionality principles.64 The plurality 
stressed that the reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges 
and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible 
conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.65 Justice 
Stevens believed that there was a low likelihood that juvenile offenders 
engage in a cost-benefit analysis that gives any weight to the possibility 
of a severe legal consequence, like execution.66 As a result, the plurality 
determined that the death penalty was an ineffective and inappropriate 
punishment for juveniles.67 
Thompson was not the only Supreme Court case finding that 
traditional deterrence rationales for severe punishment are ineffective for 
juveniles and therefore should be less severe because juveniles are less 
susceptible to deterrence.68 Deterrence prevents criminal behavior by 
fear of punishment,69 yet more than once the Court has found that 
juveniles are less susceptible to deterrence.70 Juveniles are less likely to 
take possible punishment into consideration because juveniles’ “lack of 
maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility . . . often result in 
impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”71 The Court, like 
experts who have studied juvenile psychosocial immaturity,72 has 
recognized that juveniles should not be treated the same as adults 
because of their immaturity.73 If deterrence is not as effective when the 
culprit is a juvenile rather than an adult, then the punishment for 
juveniles should reflect this ineffectiveness and should not be as 
severe.74 
Likewise, the retribution rationale is not as strong with a juvenile as 
63. Id. at 838. 
64. Id. at 834–35 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). 
65. Id. at 835. 
66. Id. at 836–38. 
67. Id. at 838. 
68. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571–72 
(2005). 
69. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 514 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “deterrence”). 
70. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 72; Roper, 543 U.S. at 571. 
71. Graham, 560 U.S. at 72 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
72. See supra Part I.B. 
73. See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 72; Roper, 543 U.S. at 571. 
74. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 571–72; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 836–38 (1988) 
(Stevens, J., plurality opinion). 
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with an adult.75 Under the retribution rationale, criminal sentences are 
directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.76 The 
Court has found that retribution is not proportional for capital 
punishment when culpability is “diminished, to a substantial degree, by 
reason of youth and immaturity.”77 Such proportionality analysis was 
extended by the Court to also apply to life imprisonment of juveniles for 
non-homicide crimes.78 
Much like retribution, the rehabilitation rationale should also be 
considered less applicable to juvenile sexting. The purpose of 
rehabilitation is to “improve a criminal’s character and outlook so that 
he or she can function in society without committing other crimes.”79 
However, current Washington law only concerns sexting when a 
juvenile is in the photo.80 If those involved in sexting are both adults, 
then their conduct is legal and the law no longer applies.81 This suggests 
that Washington has an interest in teenage sexting only until the 
teenagers turn eighteen.82 This is much different than other crimes like 
theft or murder, which will continue to be illegal when the juvenile 
becomes an adult. If the crime will continue to be illegal when the 
juvenile becomes an adult, I argue that society has a legal interest in 
rehabilitation both before and after the juvenile becomes an adult. 
Conversely, if a crime will not continue to be illegal when the juvenile 
becomes an adult—such as sexting—then I argue that society will have a 
legal interest in rehabilitation only until the juvenile becomes an adult. I 
believe that this distinction suggests that society has a weaker interest in 
rehabilitation for sexting than for other crimes like theft or murder. 
B. Prosecutorial Response to Juvenile Sexting 
In 2010, Miller v. Mitchell83 highlighted potential dangers of 
prosecutorial discretion in juvenile sexting cases.84 After images of teens 
75. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 71. 
76. Id. 
77. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571. 
78. Graham, 560 U.S. at 72. 
79. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1398–99 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “rehabilitation”). 
80. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.050 (2012). 
81. See id. (describing a crime for possession of sexually explicit images only of juveniles, not of 
adults). 
82. See, e.g., id. § 9.68A.001. 
83. 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010). 
84. Id. at 143–44.  
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in bathing suits or opaque bras circulated through the community, the 
prosecutor threatened to charge the teens with felony child pornography 
crimes if they refused to attend a program on sexting.85 Generally, 
prosecutors can decide whether or not to prosecute and what charges to 
file so long as they have probable cause of a statutory violation.86 The 
parents in Miller protested that the pictures included no nudity, while the 
prosecutor claimed that because the girls posed provocatively, the 
images constituted child pornography.87 Despite the disagreement as to 
the nature of the photographs, the prosecutor stood by his initial 
interpretation and promised to prosecute if the children did not attend the 
program.88 This case illustrates the wide discretion child pornography 
statutes give prosecutors in deciding both what constitutes child 
pornography and what punishment should apply in juvenile sexting 
cases.89 
Wide prosecutorial discretion can lead to unpredictable charging 
decisions among prosecutors. A University of New Hampshire study on 
the prosecution of juvenile sexting revealed certain themes in 
prosecutors’ decisions to file charges.90 Thirty-seven percent of the 
prosecutors indicating that they had handled a sexting case reported 
never filing charges in sexting cases, while twenty-one percent reported 
that either all or nearly all of their sexting cases ended in charges filed.91 
When the case was youth-only and involved malicious, non-consensual 
or abusive behavior, arrests were made against the juvenile only thirty-
six percent of the time.92 This means that the prosecutors who indicated 
that they had handled a sexting case dropped over half of the sexting 
cases involving malicious intent, bullying, coercion, or harassment.93 In 
85. Id. at 144. 
86. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). 
87. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d at 144. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Wendy Walsh et al., Sexting: When Are State Prosecutors Deciding to Prosecute?, CRIMES 
AGAINST CHILDREN RES. CENTER (Jan. 2013), http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV294_Walsh_ 
Sexting%20&%20prosecution_2-6-13.pdf. The study’s participants were 236 prosecutors who 
indicated that they had handled a sexting case in a state court. “Sexting” in the survey taken by the 
prosecutors was defined as “sexual images produced by juveniles (with no adult involvement).” The 
study included creating or distributing such images as sexting. The study also included high school 
students who are above the age of 17—i.e., 18 or 19 year olds. Id. at 1. 
91. Id. at 2. 
92. Id. at 3. 
93. Id. 
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light of malicious sexting having such serious consequences,94 I believe 
charges should be filed in more than thirty-six percent of the cases to 
allow for further investigation. A different approach—other than relying 
on prosecutors to apply discretion—is needed to combat prosecutorial 
discretion and raise the percentage of cases charged. 
C. Legislative Responses to Juvenile Sexting 
Legislatures across the country have slowly begun to respond to the 
juvenile sexting problem. As of publication, twenty states have amended 
their criminal codes to address juvenile sexting.95 Those states that have 
addressed juvenile sexting by amending their criminal code have done so 
using a variety of approaches.96 The approaches vary by—among other 
things—the penalty of the violation, the mens rea required, and 
affirmative defenses available.97 
Most commonly, states addressing juvenile sexting have simply 
provided a lesser penalty for violation of the statute.98 Of the twenty 
states that have amended their criminal code to address juvenile sexting, 
nine99 include a misdemeanor as the strictest penalty for, among other 
elements, a first offense free of malicious intent.100 On the far end of the 
spectrum, West Virginia will not even charge sexting juveniles with a 
94. See supra Part I.A. 
95. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-309 (West 2013); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-609 (West 2013); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-196h (West 2014); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.0141 (LexisNexis 2013); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100 (West 2013); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 712-1215.6 (LexisNexis 
2013); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/3-40 (West 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:81.1.1 (West 
2013); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1463.03 (LexisNexis 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.737 
(LexisNexis 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-71.1 (West 2013); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 458-l 
(Consol. 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-27.1-03.3 (West 2013); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 6321 (West 2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-9-1.4 (West 2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-
33 (West 2013); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.261 (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1206 
(LexisNexis 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2802b (West 2013); W. VA. CODE § 61-8C-3b (West 
2013). 
96. See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 15. 
97. Id. 
98. See, e.g., id. 
99. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-609(d) (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-196h(c); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 16-12-100(3); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 712-1215.6(4); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-
27.1-03.3(1)(2) (statute applies to sexting involving adults only, juveniles only, or both); 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6321(b)−(c); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-33; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§ 43.261(c),(d); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1206(2)(b)−(c). 
100. See, e.g., Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 15. Only three states that have amended their 
criminal codes to include juvenile sexting still prosecute juvenile sexting as a felony. FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 847.0141; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1463.03, 28-1463.04, 28-1463.05; UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-10-1206. 
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misdemeanor, instead requiring the State’s prosecutors to charge a 
sexting juvenile with a delinquency.101 
States addressing juvenile sexting also consider the juveniles’ state of 
mind. Nearly all of the states require mens rea to some extent.102 Of 
those states that require mens rea, the state of mind required is either 
knowingly, intentionally, or purposefully.103 Some states include 
language suggesting a concern for bullying.104 Some of these states’ 
statutes include “intentionally” or “knowingly” as the required mens rea 
for the bullying provisions.105 This suggests that these states are 
concerned with any desire to bully or sext and do not consider negligent 
bullying or sexting to be as culpable. In dealing with cyberbullying, 
these states specifically require actions such as commanding, inducing, 
or distributing with intent to cause harm or humiliation for the juvenile 
to fall under the bullying aspect of the statute.106 
State legislatures are also split on affirmative defenses in juvenile 
sexting statutes. Of the eight states that do include an affirmative 
101. W. VA. CODE § 61-8C-3b (West 2013). 
102. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-309 (LexisNexis 2013); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-609; 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-196h; FLA. STAT. ANN.  § 847.0141; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 712-
1215.6; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:81.1.1 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1463.03; NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 200.737 (LexisNexis 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-4 (West 2013); N.Y. SOC. 
SERV. LAW § 235.22 (Consol. 2013); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-27.1-03.3; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 6321; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-9-1.4 (West 2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-33; TEX. 
PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.261; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1206; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2802b 
(2013). 
103. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-309; ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-609; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 53a-196h; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.0141; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 712-1215.6; LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14:81.1.1; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1463.03; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.737; N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-4; N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 235.22; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-27.1-03.3; 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6321; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-9-1.4; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-
33; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.261; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1206; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 2802b. 
104. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 712-1215.6 (“A minor commits the offense . . . if the 
minor: . . . (B) Intentionally or knowingly commands, requests, or encourages another minor . . . to 
transmit to any person a nude photograph . . . of a minor or the minor’s self.”); N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 12.1-27.1-03.3 (“A person is guilty . . . if˘. . . that person: . . . b. Distributes . . . a sexually 
expressive image with the intent to cause emotional harm or humiliation to any individual depicted 
in the sexually expressive image . . . .”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6321 (“[A] minor commits a 
misdemeanor . . . when, with the intent to coerce, intimidate, torment, harass or otherwise cause 
emotional distress to another minor, the minor: . . . (2) transmits, distributes, publishes, or 
disseminates a visual depiction of any minor in a state of nudity . . . .”). 
105. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 712-1215.6; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-27.1-03.3; 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6321. 
106. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 712-1215.6; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-27.1-03.3; 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6321. 
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defense, six states107 include an affirmative possession defense only for a 
juvenile receiving the sexually explicit image.108 The affirmative 
defenses for these states mostly require that the receiver of the image 
destroyed the image, took reasonable steps to either destroy or report the 
image, did not solicit the image, or a combination of the preceding 
elements.109 These six states do not provide an affirmative defense for a 
juvenile sending a sexually explicit image.110 In fact, the two states that 
do provide an affirmative defense for the juvenile sender have strict 
limitations focusing on the relationship between the sender and receiver 
of the sexually explicit image.111 One requires a dating or spousal 
relationship between the sender and the recipient,112 while the other 
requires a reasonable belief that the receiver is a willing recipient.113 The 
affirmative defenses available by states that have addressed juvenile 
sexting may suggest that states find juveniles less culpable when they do 
not have the intent to further distribute the image or when the sexting is 
consensual. 
D. Juvenile Sexting in Washington 
Although twenty state legislatures have taken steps to address the 
problematic trend, juvenile sexting in Washington is still subject to child 
pornography laws.114 Currently, the Washington statute that applies to 
sexting is one that addresses sexual exploitation of children.115 Chapter 
9.68A of the Revised Code of Washington states the provisions of 
107. Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Nevada, and Vermont. 
108. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-309(c); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-609(c); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 847.0141(1)(b); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 712-1215.6(2); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.737(3); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2802b(a)(2). 
109. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-309(c); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-609(c); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 847.0141(1)(b); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 712-1215.6(2); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.737(3); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2802b(a)(2). 
110. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-309; ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-609; FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 847.0141; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 712-1215.6; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.737; VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 13, § 2802b. 
111. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1463.03, 28-1463.04 (LexisNexis 2013); TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 43.261 (West 2013). 
112. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.261. 
113. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1463.03. 
114. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.050 (2012); see also, e.g., Jan Hoffman, A Girl’s Nude 
Photo, and Altered Lives, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/27/us/ 
27sexting.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
115. See WASH. REV. CODE ch. 9.68A. 
 
                                                     
14 - McEllrath_after final author review.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2014  9:26 PM 
2014] KEEPING UP WITH TECHNOLOGY 1023 
Washington’s sexual exploitation of children law.116 In relevant part, this 
law provides that: 
A person commits the crime of dealing in depictions of a minor 
engaged in sexually explicit conduct in the first degree when he 
or she: 
(i) Knowingly develops, duplicates, publishes, prints, 
disseminates, exchanges, finances, attempts to finance, or sells a 
visual or printed matter that depicts a minor engaged in an act of 
sexually explicit conduct as defined in RCW 9.68A.011(4) (a) 
through (e); or  
(ii) Possesses with intent to develop, duplicate, publish, print, 
disseminate, exchange, or sell any visual or printed matter that 
depicts a minor engaged in an act of sexually explicit conduct as 
defined in RCW 9.68A.011(4) (a) through (e).117 
The statute’s use of “person” encompasses both adults and juveniles. 
The plain language of Section 9.68A.050 does not distinguish between 
the two.118 Under the statute, “[a] person commits the crime” when the 
necessary elements are met.119 Courts in Washington and other states 
have found that the interpretation of “person” in child pornography 
statutes includes juveniles.120 
Federal courts, interpreting the federal child pornography statute121—
which includes the term “person”122 and a similar intent as the 
Washington statute123—have also determined that “person” includes 
juveniles.124 In finding no record that a child would be less traumatized 
if the child pornography was created or transmitted by a child rather than 
an adult, a federal court in Clark v. Roccanova125 held that it did not 
matter that the defendants were not adults.126 The Court further found 
unconvincing the defense that the statute’s words “use of a minor” 
116. Id. 
117. Id. § 9.68A.050(1)(a). 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. See, e.g., Clark v. Roccanova, 772 F. Supp. 2d 844, 847 (E.D. Ky. 2011); State v. T.J.M., 
139 Wash. App. 845, 850–51, 162 P.3d 1175, 1178–79 (2007) (holding that a juvenile two years 
older than the victim met the statutory standard of a “person” two years older than the victim). 
121. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2008). 
122. Id. 
123. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.001. 
124. E.g., Clark, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 847. 
125. 772 F. Supp. 2d 844 (E.D. Ky. 2011). 
126. Id. 
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demonstrated Congress’s intent to target only adults.127 
Furthermore, the Washington statute states that Washington’s interest 
to protect children from exploitation “extends to stamping out the vice of 
child pornography at all levels of the distribution chain.”128 With an 
interest in protecting juveniles at all levels of a potential distribution 
chain,129 the statute could potentially include initial sexting between 
consenting juveniles. Although it is not guaranteed to occur, it is 
possible for the sexually explicit image to fall into the hands of a third 
party and become available to others.130 By addressing juvenile sexting 
at the earliest part of the distribution chain—the source—the image from 
sexting would not reach the rest of the distribution chain. In this way, the 
State could possibly ensure that this form of child pornography will not 
reach other levels of the distribution chain. Washington has therefore 
expressed its interest in preventing the creation of child pornography—
131under which the sexually explicit images of juvenile sexting’s falls.132 
The legislative intent to prosecute juveniles under the statute is also 
supported by the available affirmative defenses under Chapter 9.68A.133 
The chapter lists a number of affirmative defenses: working as law 
enforcement, providing individual case treatment as a recognized 
medical facility, conducting research in partnership or cooperation with 
a higher education institution.134 Being a juvenile is not included as an 
affirmative defense.135 However, other statutes intended to protect 
juveniles—like statutory rape—do include protection from prosecution 
when those involved are close in age.136 This could mean that the 
Washington State Legislature did not consider age proximity to be a 
valid defense to child pornography, no matter how close in age the 
juveniles might be.137 Furthermore, the Legislature did not include youth 
as part of the exclusive list of affirmative defenses for child pornography 
127. Id. 
128. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.001(2). 
129. See id. 
130. See, e.g., A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
131. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.001. 
132. See id. § 9.68A.011. 
133. Id. ch. 9.68A. 
134. Id. §§ 9.68A.110(4), (6). 
135. See id. 
136. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.073, .076, .079 (2012). 
137. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.050 (lacking language that would provide an age proximity 
defense). 
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in its 2010 amendment bill,138 and did not seek to add any defenses to 
the list in its 2012 amendment bill.139 When these decisions were made, 
juvenile sexting was in the news and case law on the subject was 
available.140 The fact that the Washington State Legislature did not 
include a defense for a juvenile offender suggests the Legislature 
intended for the statute to allow the prosecution of juveniles. 
Washington courts, in interpreting statutes, have determined that the 
exclusion of a defense from a statute that has a limited number of 
defenses suggests that the Legislature intended to exclude the 
availability of the defense.141 
In sum, the plain language and the lack of an age-related affirmative 
defense of the statute suggests that Washington intends to include 
juveniles under the prosecution of the child pornography statute. The 
plain language uses “persons” and does not differentiate between adults 
and juveniles.142 Further, the legislative intent supplements the plain 
language. The statute explicitly states that its purpose is to protect 
juveniles from exploitation and that this intent allows prosecution at all 
levels of distribution.143 This extension of prosecution to all levels of 
distribution would logically include sexting among juveniles, which, if 
distributed, would be the first step toward dissemination. Lastly, the 
failure to include an affirmative defense,144 despite extensive media 
coverage and public awareness on the issue,145 supports prosecuting 
juvenile sexting under the statute. 
III. PROPOSAL FOR WASHINGTON TO ADOPT A TWO-TIERED 
SYSTEM 
The possibility of severe prosecution under Washington’s child 
pornography statute illustrates the need for legislative reform. Juveniles 
are often treated differently than adults in the courts due to their 
138. H.R. 2424, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2010) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 9.68A, 
9.94A). 
139. H.R. 2177, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 9.68A). 
140. See, e.g., Jeremy Pawloski, Two Lacey Teens Arrested in Sexting Case, THE SEATTLE TIMES 
(Jan. 29, 2010, 8:51 AM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2010926927_websexting29m.html.  
141. See, e.g., Go2Net, Inc. v. Freeyellow.com, Inc., 158 Wash. 2d 247, 254, 143 P.3d 590, 593 
(2006). 
142. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.050. 
143. Id. § 9.68A.001(2). 
144. See id. § 9.68A.110. 
145. See, e.g., Pawloski, supra note 140. 
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immaturity and a perceived lesser culpability.146 As such, they should 
also be treated differently in the context of juvenile sexting. Juveniles 
are more capable of character reform than adults147 and, because of this 
capacity to change, punishments should distinguish between adults and 
juveniles. Further, a legislative response is needed because prosecutors 
have wide discretion to determine whether to charge juvenile sexting.148 
While this is not necessarily an issue, problems can arise if prosecutors 
abuse their discretion.149 Therefore, legislative action should be taken to 
separate juveniles from adults, preventing prosecutors from abusing their 
discretion and imposing overly severe punishments. 
Washington’s current child pornography statute punishes juvenile 
sexting too severely.150 Given the complex motives and consequences of 
juvenile sexting, the Washington State Legislature should follow other 
states151 and adopt a new approach to this growing problem. This 
Comment suggests a two-tiered structure that better reflects the differing 
natures of non-malicious and malicious juvenile sexting. 
Because psychosocial immaturity often prevents teenagers from 
considering the consequences of their conduct, the first tier should 
assign mild punishments for those engaged in non-malicious sexting. 
However, because cyberbullying involves malicious intent,152 the second 
tier should assign elevated punishments for those engaged in this 
conduct. In these situations, diversion classes153 or misdemeanors may 
not be severe enough to punish the malicious conduct. Differentiating 
between malicious action and non-malicious action by using two tiers 
would be preferable. The first tier should include diversion or a 
misdemeanor charge as a general punishment for juvenile sexting. The 
second tier, to address cyberbullying, should include any sexting that 
involved malicious intent. This tier should have a stricter punishment, 
charging cyberbullying juveniles with a felony. Neither tier should 
146. See supra Part II.A. 
147. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005). 
148. See supra Part II.B. 
149. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 
(1981). 
150. See supra Part II.D. 
151. See supra notes 98–113 and accompanying text. 
152. See Kelly A. Albin, Bullies in a Wired World: The Impact of Cyberspace Victimization on 
Adolescent Mental Health and the Need for Cyberbullying Legislation in Ohio, 25 J. L. & HEALTH 
155, 162 (2012). 
153. Diversion programs are community programs such as “job training, education, and the like, 
which .  .  . may lead to the dismissal of the charges” if the program is completed. BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 546 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “diversion program”). 
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include sex offender registration because juveniles are less mature than 
adults and more likely to be reformed,154 making a severe and long-term 
punishment like sex offender registration—with its lifelong 
consequences—155 inappropriate for either tier. 
Washington law needs to change to treat juvenile sexting differently 
than traditional child pornography. Juveniles inadequately consider 
negative consequences of their actions,156 frustrating any deterrence a 
severe penalty may have.157 Moreover, other states have begun to 
remove juvenile sexting from their child pornography statutes.158 Lastly, 
the new law should apply only to juveniles and should not extend to 
adults.159 
A. Tier 1: Juvenile Sexting Without Malicious Intent 
Washington should reduce the current maximum charge for non-
malicious juvenile sexting from a felony with required sex offender 
registration160 to a misdemeanor. Although juveniles are more likely to 
focus on short-term rewards and less likely to consider legal or long-
term consequences,161 juvenile sexting should be a punishable crime to 
deter any juveniles who actually will consider the long-term 
consequences. Because the statute is less likely to deter juveniles from 
sexting, the penalty should be less severe, but not removed entirely. 
The adolescent-adult distinction, exemplified in the Thompson 
plurality’s decision and in the United States Supreme Court’s other 
decisions,162 should be extended to juvenile sexting.  Punishing a 
juvenile who uses a cell phone to send a sexually explicit photo by the 
same standard as an adult possessing child pornography—with 
punishments like long-term incarceration163 and registration as a sex 
154. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005). 
155. Jill Levenson & Leo Cotter, The Effect of Megan’s Law on Sex Offender Reintegration, 21 J. 
CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 49, 61–62 (2005). 
156. See supra Part II.A. 
157. See supra Part I.B. 
158. See supra Part II.C. 
159. See infra Part III.D. 
160. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.050 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.130 (2012). 
161. See supra Part I.B. 
162. See, e.g., Martin R. Gardner, The Categorical Distinction Between Adolescents and Adults: 
The Supreme Court’s Juvenile Punishment Cases—Constitutional Implications for Regulating 
Teenage Sexual Activity, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 28–32 (2013). 
163. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.050; WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021. 
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offender—164contradicts proportionality principles.165 “From a moral 
standpoint, it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with 
those of an adult [because] a greater possibility exists that a minor’s 
character deficiencies will be reformed.”166 Juveniles are more capable 
of change than adults167 and juvenile actions are “less likely to be 
evidence of ‘irretrievably depraved character’” than comparable adult 
action.168 Because juveniles are more capable of change and their actions 
are less likely derived from an “irretrievably depraved character,”169 
juvenile punishment, including sexting punishment, should not include 
the severe and long-term consequences that Washington’s child 
pornography statute provides.170 
As a fundamental goal of the juvenile justice system,171 rehabilitation 
supports a lenient punishment for juvenile sexting. Rehabilitation is as 
equally important a goal of the juvenile justice system as the goal of 
punishing wrongdoers.172 Both the Washington State Legislature and the 
Washington Supreme Court recognizes the importance of rehabilitation 
in the juvenile justice system. The Juvenile Justice Act of 1977173 made 
Washington’s juvenile courts more punitive, but courts recognized that 
the Act still preserved the rehabilitative aspect of juvenile courts that is 
not present in the wholly punitive adult courts.174 The Washington 
Supreme Court has recognized that, despite the Juvenile Justice Act 
164. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.050; WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.130. 
165. See Elizabeth M. Ryan, Note, Sexting: How the State Can Prevent a Moment of Indiscretion 
from Leading to a Lifetime of Unintended Consequences for Minors and Young Adults, 96 IOWA L. 
REV. 357, 375 (2010). 
166. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005). In making its decision, the Court took into 
account the difficulty psychologists have in differentiating between crimes based on immaturity and 
crimes of irreparable corruption. Id. at 573. 
167. Id. at 570. 
168. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570). 
169. Id. 
170. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.68A.050; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.20.021, 9A.44.130. 
171. See State v. Posey, 174 Wash. 2d 131, 143, 272 P.3d 840, 846 (2012) (Madsen, C.J., 
dissenting). 
172. Id. 
173. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 13.40 (2012). 
174. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.010(2) (“It is the intent of the legislature that a system 
capable of having primary responsibility for, being accountable for, and responding to the needs of 
youthful offenders . . . be established.” (emphasis added)); State v. Saenz, 175 Wash. 2d 167, 172–
73, 283 P.3d 1094, 1097 (2012) (identifying that despite the Act’s shift toward administering 
justice, the legislature intended for the statute to still “[preserve] the fundamental difference 
between juvenile courts and adult courts—unlike wholly punitive adult courts, juvenile courts 
remained rehabilitative.”). 
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being amended several times, the Act has kept its focus on the needs of 
juveniles and the goals of rehabilitation and accountability.175 Those 
amendments have reiterated that the goal of the juvenile justice system is 
to rehabilitate juveniles and promote their reintegration into society.176 
Currently in Washington, juveniles sending a sexually explicit image of 
themselves are subject to a possible felony conviction and sex offender 
registration.177 Such severe punishment for an act that lacks malicious 
intent seems to be inconsistent with the rehabilitation goal of the 
juvenile justice system.178 Likewise, the stigma of a felony or sex 
offender registration would complicate the juvenile’s reintegration into 
society,179 further making the punishment inconsistent with 
rehabilitation. 
Empirical data also suggests that a less severe punishment, such as 
diversion, may be the best approach.180 Diversion programs can be more 
effective in reducing recidivism than the traditional justice system.181 
Although studies have shown that juveniles are less likely to consider 
long-term consequences of their actions,182 studies on diversion 
programs in Florida183 and Michigan184 suggest that diversion programs 
reduce the recidivism rates of juvenile offenders. Thus, some diversion 
programs may lead juveniles to actually consider long-term 
consequences.185 Diversion programs could, through education, bring the 
dangers of sexting to the juveniles’ attention.186 This could mitigate the 
175. See State v. Weber, 159 Wash. 2d 252, 283, 149 P.3d 646, 662 (2006). 
176. See Substitute H.B. 1793, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011) (“One of the goals of the 
juvenile justice system is to rehabilitate juvenile offenders . . . .”). 
177. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.050 (2012). 
178. See, e.g., Mirko Bagaric, Consistency and Fairness in Sentencing—The Splendor of Fixed 
Penalties, 2 CAL. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2009) (discussing the possible inconsistencies between 
rehabilitation and punishment). 
179. Jill Levenson & Leo Cotter, The Effect of Megan’s Law on Sex Offender Reintegration, 21 J. 
CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 49, 61–62 (2005). 
180. See supra Part I.B. 
181. Holly Wilson & Robert Hoge, The Effect of Youth Diversion Programs on Recidivism, 40 
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 497, 509–10 (2012). 
182. See supra Part I.B. 
183. Richard Dembo et al., Evaluation of an Innovative Post-Arrest Diversion Program: 12-
Month Recidivism Analysis, 47 J. OFFENDER REHAB. 356 (2008). 
184. Kay Hodges et al., Recidivism, Costs, and Psychosocial Outcomes for a Post-Arrest Juvenile 
Diversion Program, 50 J. OFFENDER REHAB. 447 (2011). 
185. Id.; Dembo et al., supra note 183. 
186. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-13g(b) (West 2013) (listing a number of topics that 
should be covered in any sexting educational diversion program, including both legal and nonlegal 
consequences). 
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issue of juveniles failing to consider the long-term consequences of 
sexting and allow for a possibly more severe punishment following any 
subsequent violation. Several other states have followed similar 
approaches to addressing juvenile sexting.187 
Despite the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile justice system, the 
legislative intent of Washington’s child pornography statute—as 
illustrated by its plain language188 and legislative history189—suggests 
Washington intended to prosecute both juveniles and adults to prevent 
the sexual exploitation of children. Washington’s current statute 
allowing for severely punishing juvenile sexting under child 
pornography law190 should be considered in any future amendment the 
Legislature makes to the statute. These two conflicting interests—
rehabilitation and severe punishment—can be addressed by finding a 
balance between the two. The mental immaturity of juveniles suggests 
that a felony charge and sex offender registration is inappropriate,191 but 
the Washington State Legislature’s intent suggests the State is interested 
in a more severe punishment than diversion.192 The State’s interest in 
punishment should be balanced with the immaturity of juveniles and the 
justice system’s recognition that juveniles should be treated less severely 
than adults. Under the current child pornography statute, adults can face 
felony charges and sex offender registration.193 Therefore, the most 
severe approach that avoids felony charges and sex offender 
registration—a misdemeanor penalty—would be the appropriate 
response for voluntary, non-malicious, juvenile sexting. 
B. Tier 2: Juvenile Sexting with Malicious Intent—Cyberbullying 
A separate statutory section should cover malicious sexting to address 
cyberbullying. The separate section should also address concerns the 
Washington State Legislature expressed through its child pornography 
statute. 
Washington should punish malicious sexting as a felony. Although 
187. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-4 (West 2013); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 235.22 (Consol. 
2013). 
188. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.68A.001, .050 (2012). 
189. See H.B. 2424, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2010); H.B. 2177, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 
2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.001. 
190. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.050; WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.130 (2012). 
191. See supra Part I.B. 
192. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.001. 
193. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.050; WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.130. 
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cyberbullying through sexting may not be as common as consensual 
sexting among juveniles, the harm of cyberbullying can be extreme.194 
Much like the long-term harm that can occur from child pornography,195 
cyberbullying can have a lasting effect.196 Once sexually explicit images 
enter the public realm of the digital world, they are difficult to remove, 
adding permanency to the images and harm.197 Although some empirical 
data suggests a severe penalty is less likely to deter juvenile behavior,198 
the data does not state that a severe penalty will fail to deter all juvenile 
behavior. This means that a severe penalty could possibly deter some 
juvenile behavior. When extreme consequences like suicide are 
involved, the chance to deter some malicious sexting is arguably worth 
the severe punishment. Therefore, malicious sexting should be charged 
with a felony because of the potential severe harm to the victim. 
The Washington State Legislature’s intent to severely punish child 
pornography should still apply to cyberbullying. When a juvenile’s 
image is sent as a means of cyberbullying, malicious intent is present.199 
The malicious intent is consistent with the type of activity from which 
the Washington State Legislature intended to protect children under the 
child pornography statute—intentional or knowing exploitation of a 
minor.200 This is distinguishable from sexting under the first tier of the 
proposed statute201 because an intent to harm is present. The child 
pornography statute is intended to protect the victim.202 When an intent 
to harm is present, the statute should offer the potential victim full 
protection from harm pursuant to the Legislature’s intent in the child 
pornography statute. However, even with malicious intent, sex offender 
registration is not appropriate203 and should not be included in either tier 
of the statute. 
194. See Celizic, supra note 4 (explaining the suicide of a teen after her sexually explicit 
photograph was spread among her peers via sexting). 
195. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Limits of Child Pornography, 89 IND. L.J. 1437, 1461–64 
(2014). 
196. Id. 
197. See Cyberbullying, SAFETEENS.ORG, http://www.safeteens.org/relationships/cyberbullying/ 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2014). 
198. See supra Part I.B. 
199. The definition of cyberbullying includes malice: “the abuse, coercion, harassment, or 
threatening of another person through electronic media such as . . . text messages.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 469 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “cyberbullying”). 
200. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.68A.001, .050 (2012). 
201. See supra Part III.A. 
202. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.001. 
203. See infra Part III.C. 
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C.  Sex Offender Registration Is Not Appropriate for Either Juvenile 
Sexting or Juvenile Cyberbullying 
Because juveniles lack the mental capacity to appreciate the serious 
consequences of sexting, the long-term stigma of a sex offender 
registration is a disproportionate penalty for any juvenile sexting. 
Society in general may have difficulty accepting a sex offender.204 The 
potential risk of being ostracized by society may not create a sufficient 
deterrence to juvenile sexting to justify its use because juveniles do not 
tend to consider the consequences of their actions.205 If juveniles have a 
tendency to disregard future consequences of their actions, even the 
possibility of becoming a sex offender and being an outcast of society 
seems unlikely to have the deterring impact that the statute intends. 
Further, juvenile sexting is not as culpable as other child pornography 
that justifies sex offender registration. Sex offender registration focuses 
on public safety by informing the public of potentially dangerous sexual 
predators in the community.206 However, many juvenile sex offenders 
may not be motivated by deviant preferences or deviant sexual arousal 
towards a minor,207 making them unlikely candidates for repeating 
offenses.208 If juveniles do not have a deviant sexual arousal toward 
juveniles that would threaten public safety, then it follows that sex 
offender registration for juvenile sexting—and non-malicious sexting in 
particular—does not serve the informative purpose engrained in sex 
offender statutes because these juveniles are not dangerous sexual 
predators. If a juvenile’s sexting habits are motivated by deviant 
preferences, it may be argued that these juveniles should be given the 
same punishment as adults—sex offender registration. However, 
juvenile character deficiencies have a greater likelihood of being 
reformed than adults.209 If juvenile character deficiencies are more likely 
to be reformed, then they should be given the opportunity to reform 
204. See Levenson & Cotter, supra note 179, at 58. 
205. See supra Part I.B. 
206. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102–03 (2003). 
207. See FRANK C. DICATALDO, THE PERVERSION OF YOUTH: CONTROVERSIES IN THE 
ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF JUVENILE SEX OFFENDERS 47 (2009) (referencing a study where 
“juvenile sex offenders did not demonstrate elevated levels of deviant fantasy but had fewer 
fantasies with nondeviant content, leading the researchers to conclude that [adolescent] sexual 
offending . . . may not be related to elevations in deviant fantasies but to deficits in nondeviant 
fantasies.”). 
208. Id. at 18. 
209. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005). 
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instead of given a permanent and severe punishment.210 Therefore, 
juveniles should not be required to register as sex offenders. 
D. Washington’s Approach to Juvenile Sexting Should Not Provide a 
Defense for Adult Defendants 
The proposed statute should address only juveniles who send, receive, 
or possess a sexually explicit image of a juvenile. Because of the 
importance of punishing child pornography in Washington State—as 
exhibited by its statute and amendments—adults sexting with a juvenile 
should still be subject to Washington’s current child pornography 
statute, whether the sexting is consensual or not. Opponents of this 
approach may argue that the laws should allow for an acceptable age 
differential when an adult is sexting with a juvenile211—similar to 
statutory rape laws in the state of Washington.212 However, as the 
California Court of Appeals in People v. Gonzalez213 discussed, one 
danger of child pornography that is not found in cases of statutory rape 
is the possibility of the image being duplicated or copied.214 Further, 
because adults’ mental maturity allows for a better understanding of 
long-term consequences, adults are better able to control impulses and 
recognize the long-term danger of the sexually explicit image being 
duplicated and disseminated.215 Therefore, because of the unique 
dangers of child pornography and the maturity difference between 
juveniles and adults, any special treatment in juvenile sexting cases 
should apply only to juvenile offenders. 
CONCLUSION 
Washington should amend its criminal code to include a separate 
statute addressing juvenile sexting. Considering case law, legislative 
history, and empirical studies, Washington State should not continue to 
charge juvenile sexting under the current child pornography statute. 
210. See, e.g., id. (noting that juveniles are more likely than adults to be reformed as a basis for 
the Court’s holding that the death penalty is prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
for individuals who were under the age of eighteen at the time of their crime). 
211. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.26 (West 2013) (providing an affirmative defense for 
a defendant when the defendant and other individual involved are dating and within two years in 
age). 
212. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.073, .076, .079 (2012). 
213. 211 Cal. App. 4th 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). 
214. Id. at 136–37. 
215. Steinberg & Scott, supra note 38, at 74. 
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Doing so is inappropriate because the current statute requires juveniles 
to register as sex offenders and deal with the subsequent stigma and 
long-term consequences of sex offender status. A new statute should 
separate juvenile sexting into two categories: one tier for consensual, 
non-malicious juvenile sexting that carries the lesser charge of a 
misdemeanor, and a separate tier punishing malicious sexting like 
cyberbullying with a felony charge. A two-tier system will apply 
proportionate punishments for both juvenile sexting and cyberbullying. 
At the same time, the proposed system will take into consideration the 
psychosocial immaturity of juvenile decision making, which renders 
deterrence less effective and diminishes the need for retribution. This 
new approach will protect those juveniles acting without malicious 
intent while still being strict on acts of malicious intent that should be 
considered more culpable. Washington needs to provide growing 
teenagers with an opportunity to learn from their actions rather than give 
them lifelong punishments for being young and immature. 
 
 
